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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ETATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
) 
Plairtiff-Respondent,) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
JAHES W. BRADLEY, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 15307 
STATE11ENT OF 'THE NATURE OF THE Cl,SE 
This was an action brought by the State of t:tah against 
the Appellant for the offense of criminal homicide in violation 
of Title 76, Section 5, Paragraph 207, Utah Code Pnnotated, 
1953 as amended, wherein the Appellant was accused of causing 
the death of another person while operating a motor V€·hicle in 
a negligent manner while under the influence of intoxice<ting 
liquor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried by a jury in Davis County before 
District Judge '!'hornley K. Swan on Hay 26 and 27, 1977. The 
Appellant was found not suilty of criminal homicide as chars-ed 
in the information, but was found guilty of running a red light, 
and guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. The court sentenced the Appellant to a term of six 
months in the Davis courty .Cail and to pay 2 fine of $299.00 
from which the Appellant appe~ls. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Th~ Appellant seeks reversal of th~ · d J u gments render. 
against him or, in the cdtErnative, a remanc'. to the lower cour: 
for a new trial consistant with due process. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tl1is action arose out of an automobile accident Whic: 
occurred on 2eptember 11, 1976 at zpproximately 6:15p.m., at: 
intersection of State Road No. 106 and Center Streets, in Nor: 
Salt Lake, Davis County, Utah. StatE: Road Nc,, 106 runs in a 
north- south direction and Center Street runs northeasterly and 
soughwesterly. The intersection is controlled by a traffic 
light. At approximately 11:30 a.m., (T. 224), on the morning 
of the accident the Appellant arrived at the maintEnance shop 
of the construction company for whom he was employed. He testi 
fied (T. 224), that between 11:30 a.m., and 5:45p.m., thatdat 
be had consumed four or five beers while working on his truck. 
He left the shop shortly before 5:45 p.m., travE·ling several 
b1ocks to his brother-in-law's home where he consumed some chi:l 
(T. 224). He then started home, driving south on State Road!( 
The pickup truck he was driving hit a vehicle e.?.stbound on Cer.t 
Street in the controlled intersection. The driver of the other 
vehicle died as a result of injuries sustc:ined in that accident 
utah Highway Pcctrol Trooper ['aryl W. Durrant, testified (T. 64l 
that he arrived at the accident scene at approximately 6:22 p.r 
-2-
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after having been informed of the accident en his radio. Upon 
his arrival at the scene he c:ssisted in the, removc:l of the 
injured parties. He testified that he noticed an ordor of alcohol 
about the Appellant; he, therefore, demonstrated and gave the 
the Appellant a "field sobriet) test," (T. 65, 66) which con-
sisted of many mc:neuvers in which the Appellant was asked to 
stand with his feet and knees toge-,ther with his arrr.s outstretched, 
close his eyes, and tilt his head back. He testified 'T. 69), 
the Appellant swayed unsteadily. He then asked the Appellant 
tc perform a finger to nose test with his left and then his right 
hand and he testified (T. 70) ttat the Appellant touched his 
finger to his upper lip instead of his nose. Officer Durrant 
then asked the Appellant t.o walk an imaginary line, and on command, 
turn on his heel and return to the: starting point. He testified 
(T. 71), the Appellant was walking the line "a fairly good job 
until he turned around, and at that time he lost his balance and 
he had to step backwards to catch himself." Officer Durrant also 
asked the l\ppellant (T. 71) to walk around a flashlight which 
had been placed on the ground in an upright position while bent 
over. He testified (T. 72) the Appellant was able to go around 
the flashlight: only t-v.·ice and would have fallen had not the 
officer caught him. Trooper Durrant completed his investigation 
c:.t tte accident scene <md ther, took the AppeUant (T. 74) to his 
employer's shop on Cudahy Lane, and then to the Davis County Jail. 
Trooper Durrant asked the Appellant at 8:40 p.m., (T. 97) to take 
a "breathalyzer test" which was administered to him at 9:50p.m., 
-3-
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on the evening of the accident. Test results taken on the 
Si:evenson Corporation Breathalyzer, Model 900, reported a rels 
of .06 and were admitted into eviderce c:s Exhibit "I" (T • l7Si 
Eoth Officer ~hlls (a North Salt Lake Pc•l ;ce Of ~ ficer 
~ho ~as at the scene at the time of the accident) , and Officer 
Durrant testified that in his c:pinion Appellant was unC',er the 
influence of alcohol. 
At trial, other indications th<:•t Appellant had been 
drivinq under the influence of alcohol were brought out, such 
as empty beer cans (T. 19). 
As foundation,wit~ respect to his testimony conce~~ 
thE: breathaly;:er rest:l ts and alcohol burnoff rates, Lt. New~ll 
G. Knight gave testimony concernin~ his qualifications c:s an 
expert. He testified as to his position of Technical Supervis' 
of Chemical ~esting for the State of Utah and to his extensiw 
training and experience with respect tc. breathalyzer machines a: 
related matters (T. 105-108). He also testified that he wu 
personally involved with numerous controlled experiments to 
ascertain t.he c.bsorption and burnoff rates and that tre breath· 
alyzer machines were used in conjunction with t~ese exferimento 
(T. 239-241). 
~Jith respect to his expert testirrony, Dr. Terry Rich 
testified that he was the Deputy '1edical Exardner for the Stat' 
of Utah and that he was a medical doctor and had had special 
pathological training (T. 153). Dr. Rich also testified t~t 
he had training and experience as to toxicology and alcohol b~ 
-4-
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off rates. 
The trial court was satisfied with these qualifications 
and admitted the expert testimony as t 0 the probable content of 
intoxicants in the blood of the Appellant at the time of the 
accident. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THERE lvAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR A 
CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE IN-
FLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
In State v. Peterson, 21 Utah 2d 36, 210 P.2d 229 
(1949), the evidence concerning intoxication was disputed. 
Tlle trial court, in response to a request t.y defendant for a 
directed verdict summarily stated "lve see no r.erit to Appellant's 
second point. The evidence of intoxication is in conflict. That 
is for the jury to determine." 
The law is clear that circumstantial evidence, if pro-
bative and believable, is sufficient for a conviction of driving 
while intcxicated. It is equc.lly clear that an appellate court 'WOn't 
substitute its judgment for that of the jury's. State of Ohio 
v. Fields, 176 N.E. 2d 845 11960). With respect to the charge 
of driving while intoxicated, 42 A.L.R. at 1507 states the 
general policy th<•t "Where there is evidence in the' record from 
which the jury may infer th<•t the accused drove ... while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, a conviction will not 
he disturbed on appeal, though there is also evidence in the 
record to the contrary." 49 l' .• L.R. at 1397 states "Where the 
-5-
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evidence reasonably supports the d. t · 
ver lC , lts wE:-ight and cred-
ibility is for t~e jury, and, in the absence of unusual 
ci.r-
cumstances, the court will not set aside a judgment for insu~ 
ficiency of the evidence." 
If there is some believable evidence, then it is 
the jury's sole province to hear all the evidence, to deter~~ 
tt.e credibility of the ,_.i tresses, to obsc:rve the demeanor of th, 
witnesses and the defendant, to give the evidence what ~eight 
it determines, and to make a final determination as to the f~l 
of the case. 
In this case, there is an abundancoo, of evidence in-
dicating that Appellant was driving under the influence of ak~ 
at the tirre of the accident. Appellant stated to Trooper Durrar 
that he had been drinking that day (T. 66, 224). Five empty 
cans of Coors beer, three empty cartons or containers and eight 
unopened cans of beer were found in Appellant's tn;ck after the 
accident. Officer Hills also testified that when he first ar-
rived at the accident, he saw Appellant standing by the door 
of his truck. taking something froFt the• seat and put.tir:.g it be-
hind the seat where the beer was found (T. 12, 19). Bott 0~ 
ficer Mills and Officer Durrant gave their opinions, based bn 
their training and actual observations of the l\ppellant at tte 
scene that the Appellant was in fact under the: influence of 
alcohol (T. 23, 81). Officer .t-'.ills stated that Appellant was 
belligerent and wouldn't cooperate at one point (T.21). 
Durrant smelled the odor of alcohol about the Appellant 
-6-
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was told by the Appellant that he had been drinking (T. 66) . 
Appellant performed in~dequately on actual field tests demon-
strated by Officer Durrant (T. 67-72), which could have bene-
fited him. Breathalyzer results fron a test ad!'".inistered 
approximately three hours and fifty minutes after the accident 
showed a blood alcohol level of .06 (T. 175), but \~as ob,·iously 
not the sole consideration of tr,e jury in a two-day trial. 
The: evidence presented by tte officers and lay wit-
nesses show that the jury made a reasonable dE:cision clearly 
within their perogative, and that verdict should be sustained. 
In State v. Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 29~ 422 P.2d 196, 
197 (1967) this court stated: 
It is cur duty to respect thE; perogative 
of the jury as the exclusive judges of 
credibj.lity of the witnesses and as the 
determiners of the facts. Consequently we 
assure that ttey believed the state's 
evidence, and \":e survey it, together with 
all fair inferences that the jury could 
reasonably draw therefrom, in the light 
rr,ost favorable to their verdict. 
In this particular case the jury, pursuant to all of the instruc-
tion give to them by the court, made a fair determination. 
In State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212, 215 
(1957), in which Sullivan hctd been convicted of second degree 
burglary .:md on appeal argued that the evidence WCJ.s not suffi-
cient to sustain the: verdict, the Supreme Court c:.ffirmed the con-
viction stc:.ting the general principles of law: 
Before a verdict may properly be set 
aside it must appear that. the evidence 
was s~ inconclusive or unsatisfactory 
thctt reasonable minds acting fairly upon 
it must have entertained reasonable 
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doubt that cefendants committed the 
crime. Unless the evidence comrels 
such conclusion as a matter of law, 
the ,-~relet must stand. The very essence 
of trl~l b~ Jury lS th~t the jury are the 
excluslve :ud9es of the weight of the 
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses 
and the facts to he found therefrom. 
(Emphasis added) . 
Point II 
'IHE l,DMISSION OF THE BEEATHJ\LYZER RESULTS 
AND THE ACCOMPANYING EXPERT TESTIMONY INTO 
EVIDENCE WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
The tr~al judge was satisfied that the foundation 
laid for the admission of the breathalyzer results was adeq~~ 
and ttat the experts for the State who testified were sufficie· 
qualified to testify. 
Breatt.alyzer results are overv;helmingly accepted acr: 
the country as competent evidence when proper procedures are 
followed. It wus clearly estc:blished in this case that the· 
breathalyzer machine was in proper working order and that the 
test was administered properly. 
As to the admissibility of expert testimony, Utc:.h b .. 
is quite clear. In State Road Commission v. Silliman, 22 Utah 
2d 233, 448 P.2d 347 (196ru it is stated: 
The qualification of an expert witness 
is to be determined by the trial judge, 
and if he determines that a witness by 
reason of training and experience can 
assist the jury by giving an opinion on 
a matter properly before the court, we 
on appeal should not hold that testirrony 
should be stricken unless such palpable 
ignorance of the subject mat~er.is mani-
fested by the witress as to lndlcate an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial judge. 
-8-
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In Lamb. v. Bangart, 525 F.2o 602, this court said: 
The_trial court is allowed considerable 
lat1tude of di~cretion in the 2d~issibility 
of expert test1mony, and in the 2bscnce of a 
clear showing of abuse, this court will 
not reverse. A challenge to tre reliability 
of such expert testimony will be considered 
as not i~v'?l :ring it~ compet.ency bt<t its weight 
~nd cred1b1l1ty, whlch is a matter for tte 
]ury to determine. 
With respect to his testimony concerning the breccth-
alyzer machine and results and alcoho}. burnoff rates, Lt. Newell 
G. Knight save extensive testimony concerning his qualifications 
as an expert. He testified as to his position of Technical 
supervisor of Chemical Testing for the: State of Utah and to his 
eJ:tensive trainin<J and experience wi.th bre2,thc;lyzer machines c:.nd 
related matters (T. 105-108). He also testified that he was per-
sonally involved with numerous controlled experiments to ascer-
tain alcohol absorption and burnoff rates 2nd that breathalyzer 
machines were used in conjunction with these experiments (T. 239-
/41) • 
or. Terry Rich testified that he was tte Deputy Medi-
cal Examiner fer the State of Utah and the<t he was a medical 
doct.or and had had special pat.hological training IT. 153). Dr. 
Rich also testified that he had training and experience as to 
toxicology 2nd alcohol burnoff rates. 
The trial cocirt was satisfied with these qualifications 
and admitted the exfert testimony and the :ury was properly ed-
monished and instructed that the real decision was theirs. 
-9-
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Certainly the tri-1 J. d d'd 
a u gc 1 nc.t abuse his discrq. 
in determinins that the experts' te~timony would he of as~· 
· lst, 
to the jury. 
Appc,llant contends that since the brcatralyzer test 
was apprcximately three hours and fifty minutes after the ac-
cident, thE: results shouldn't bE admissible into c:vidence. 
For practica] reasons, the chem'cal tests 1 
J. are a way, 
adrni.nistered some time c;,fter a persc:n is arrested. Due to the 
particular circumstances, the delay time alw<Jys varies. Whe:n 
has been a long delay, it has been the practice in this sta~ 
tc. use expert testimony to relate the test results back to 
the time of the accident. This practice is codified in the~ 
enactment of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.5 which states: 
In any action or preceeding in which it is 
material to prove that a person was driving 
under the influence of alcohol, the results 
of a chemical test cr tEsts as authorized in 
41-6-44.10 shall be admitted as evidence 
if the chemical test ~as taken within one 
hour of the alleged incident. The level 
of the alcohol determined to be in the blood 
by the chemical test shall be presurnc:d to be 
not less than the blood alcohol level of 
the person at tte time of the incident. If 
the chemical test was not taken within one hour 
after the alleged incident, the evidence of 
the amount of alcohol in thE: person's blood 
as shovm by thE: chemical test is c.drr.issible 
if expert testimony establishes its prcbative 
value and the results of said test n•ay be 
given prima facie effect if established by 
e}:pert testimony. (Emphasis added) . 
This has always been the case law in Utah. In State of Ut~~ 
cannc.n, 17 Utah 2d 105, 404 P.2a 971 (1965), this court ovem. 
a claim of remoteness and upheld the trial court's c.llowance o' 
expert testimony. 
-10-
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There is a great ceal of case law in other jurisdictions 
on this point which is helpful here. In the absence of clear 
statutory language requirins a rElation-back, the apparent 
cverwhe,lming view throughout the country is tJ-at breathalyzer 
results, if properly administered, are adF.issible even 'l<"ithout 
any testimony relating back t.he results. Any qt<estion of time 
or delay betw~en the accident and the administration of the 
test simply goes to the weight of the evidence and is a matter 
for the jury's consideration. These jurisdictions state that 
relating bclCk the results is not necessary c:nd that the evidence 
by itself without relation-back is competEnt and probative. 
see Stateof Idaho v. Sutliff, 547 P.2d 1128 (1976); People of 
Michigan v. Kozar, 221 N.W. 2d 170 (1974); State of Arizona 
v. City Court of Tucson, 481 P.2d 766 (1971); State of New Hamp-
shire v. Gallant, 227 A.2d 597 (1967); and Toms v. State of 
Oklahoma, 239 P.2d 812 (1952). 
These cases cite many other cases which have held 
similarly with reported delays beoing over four hours. State of 
Idaho v. Sutliff, State of New Hampshire v. Gallant, and Toms 
v. state of Okalhoma (supra), take note of the fact that ad-· 
missibility of test results taken some tirre after the incident 
generally favor the defenC'.ant. State , .. Kezar, supra, st.ates 
the obvious realtion-back by experts is permissible even though 
it is not required. 
-11-
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Appellant states in his brief that tbere m t 
. us nec<,s-
sarily be a realtion-back citing the Utah Implied Consent ~t 
- at 
as authority. The Implied Consent Statute says r.othinc; 
_ at a]J 
concerning realtion-back or delay. utah c d A t o e nne. a ted 41- 6_1, 
(1917) simply allows a rec;.ltion-back by expert testirrony if tr. 
test is given more than one hour after the incid8 nt. Again 
in State of Utah v. Cannon, supra, this court stated t:hctt deJa 
is "a matter for expert medical testirrony and the jury." In t 
case, expert testimony was used to relate back the test res~t 
simply to advise the jury. 
The State offered testimony of two expert witnesses·. 
without question were able tc. establish tJ:-e probative value of 
the test results as evidence, ie., they gave testimony whi~ 
helped the jury relate back the results of the test to the t~ 
of the acc:!.dent if they wanted to. Deputy Medi.cal Exc:miner, 
Terry Rich, gave expert te,stimony as to alchool burnoff rates. 
Doctor Rich testified U:at in approximately tl:.ree hours and 
fifty minutes an individual who v;ould burn off alcohol at the 
lowest end of the "burnoff ran9e" would burn off . 036 percenta 
units while c;.n individual at tl:e top of the range viould burn c 
.072 percentage units (T. 171-174). Thus, the blood alcohol 
level approximately three hours and fifty minutes earlier coul 
be . 096 to .132 barring other factors. Another expert, Ne;;eJ: 
Knight, also testified concerning burnoff rates and gave his 
e>:pert opinion ·that Appellant could not l:ave achieved a breaf 
alyzer reading at 9:50p.m., of .06 if he had only consumed 
-!2-
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five beers that day, the first teing consumed at ll:)O a.m., 
and the last at 5:45 p.m. Any testimony as tc· "burnoff" 
could help the defendant. 
The facts upon ~·hich the e}:pert opinions were b.:;sed 
had been established, ie., that Appellant had nothing tc eat 
zll day and had ~llegedly only consumed four or five beers 
before leaving work. Upon leaving work at 5:45p.m., he allegedly 
he'd no more alcohol that day. Appellant went to his broUer-
in-law's home where he consumed "some pieces of chicken." 
Within minutes after leaving there, he was involved in the 
accident. Newell Knight testified concerning alcohol absorption 
rates (T. 244-250). The absorption rate appears to have little 
impact with respect to the facts of this case since the alcohol 
was all allegedly consumed before Appellant ate the chicken, 
as was argued by the defendant. This was only one factor 
considered by the jury. The evidence of the breath<;lyzer results 
and the expert testimony was clearly helpful to the jury. The 
experts' testimony \-cas base-,d on personal exr;.erience and know-
ledge and facts made known at t.rial. 
With respect to the authority cited ~nd the facts 
of this case, it is clear that the admission of the breathalyzer 
results and the expert testimony into evidence was not error. 
The expert testimony relating back the results ~as competent 
and "helpful" evidence for the :;ury to consider and was properly 
admitted asbeing within the judge's discretion and not prejud-
icial when taken in the light of a two-day trial and substantial 
jury instructions. 
-13-
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POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN INSTRUCTING 
THE .:-URY AS TO THE STATUTOfcY PLESU1PTIONS 
Bt.SED ON BLOOD ALCOHOL LEVEL. 
As indicated in Point II, if tre test is given 
"'·Ore 
than one hot<r after thE alleged i.ncident and expert tEstitrony 
establishes some probative value of the results, those resulb 
are given prirra fzcie effect and nonconclusive pres~mtpions 
are applicaole. If the test is given vithin one hour oft~ 
incident, then expert testimony is not required fe-r the pre-
sumptions to be applicabje. Again, it is helpfcl to review 
the law in other jurisdictions. State of New Mexico v. Tru'il: 
510 P. 2d 1079 (1973), states that the presumption i.nstnction 
is proper if the implied consent statute has been complied ;;it: 
In thE· case at bar, Utah 1 s Implied Consent StatutE was comolie( 
with in every respect. State of Idaho v. Sutliff, sunrc:, states 
We hold that this statute does not require 
extrapolation back but establishes that the 
percentage of blood alcohol as shov;n by 
chemical analysis relates back to the time 
of the alleged offense for purposes of ap-
plying the statutory presumption. This hold-
ing is in accord with those of oth8r juris-
dictions who have considered the question. 
The statute referred to is Idaho 1 s "presumption" stat.ute whose. 
language "at the time of the alleged offense" is exactly simile: 
t.o tl'.e language in Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 which statEs 
"at the time alleged." The court goes on tc- give other citatic 
and the reasons for its decision. 
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Appellant in his brief states "The legislature has 
since this occasion e-,nlarged the presumption to hold over for 
an r.our after the time of driving. At thE, tirre of the crime 
herein charged, there was no such holdover pe-,riod. • Appellant 
purportedly wants us to believe thcct befcre the 1977 amendment 
of Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.5, expert testimony was required 
even within the one-hour period. The logical conclusion from 
case law is that the presumptions h<cve 2.lw<:1ys c:.pplied even with-
out relation-back testimony and that the requirements of Utah 
code Annotated 41-6-44.5 with respect to e>:pert testimony if the 
time period is greater than one hour, is sirrply a codification 
of the comrnon-lav: principles of evidence which are simply an 
attempt to get all truthful and helpful evidence before a jury. 
In any event., the: State of Utah in this case offered 
expert testimony rE:lating back the results. 
It is urged by Respondent that ~:.nder pre-1977 Utah 
law, a presumption instruction is proper even without relating 
back test results. Furthermore, even if the court decides re-
lation-back testimony was required, Respondent has duly complied 
ar.d, therefore, a presumption instruction .,·as not prejudicial error 
in light of the entire case. 
It should be noted here that the presumption instruction 
was simply stated as being part of tbe applicable law, and left 
the decision t.o the jury. It started, "If the:re vias at the time 
... " (T. 257), without c;_uestion, "if" leaves discretion to the"jury. 
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The judge was careful to expalin the natue of the nre~umt . 
l_ ~ 1 Plon, 
ie. 1 that it was not conclusive but to be considered alona '··'. 
J y;.._ t:. 
the rest of the evidence (T. 258). 
reasonable doubt notion many times 
ThE· judge also exr: lainec; t'. 
(T. 258). 
It cannot be said that thE· Instructions 1 r un aw"·ully 
prejudiced Appellant in any wv.y. In instruction No. 1 the, 
jury was admonished to e):ercise sincere judgment. In No. 3 
the:y were e<drr.onished not to take the instr·uctions as a statE,-
ment of the facts. Instruction No. 51 which is the instn.ctio" 
comp1.ained of by the Appellant, also has a paragraph in it 
stating "If you bE>lieve" with a sub~;equent instruction to tte 
jury to weigh the evidence. Of course, they were instructed 
that they must find "beyond a reasonable doubt" the elemenb 
of the offense. Instruction No. 13 was to the effect t.hat 
c:.ny possible presumptions raised were to be applied only to 
the time-: thc:•t the defendant was driving a motor vehicle <md 
that the presumptions must be so proved "to your satisfaction 
beyond a reasonable doubt by competent. and believable evidence: 
They were also advised to determine the issues they must con-
sider all of the facts immediately proceeding and surrounding 
the occurrence and not to be P"<OVe:·d to a conclusion solely by' 
the fact of an unfortunate result. They were instructed that 
the Appellant was presumed to be• innocent until proven guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In Instruction Nc .. 18, the jury 
was instructed that they were the sole judges of the weight 
of the evidence and U:.e credibility of the ..,,i tnesses and the 
-16-
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facts. They were also told th~t they may consider any interest 
or bias that any witness may or may not have. Also, they 
were to!d "You are not bound to believe all that the witnesses 
may tave testified to nor are you bound to believe any witness; 
you may believe one witness as against many or many 2 s against 
one. In t.he light of the above observations, it is your privi-
lege to judge the weight to be given to the testimony of tt.e 
witnesses and tc determine what the facts are." (Emphasis added). 
Instruction No. 20 on expert opinions stated, "You 
~re not bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the weight 
to which you deem it entitled, whether that. be: great or slight, 
and you may reject it if, in your judgement, the: reasons for it 
a1 e unsound. " 
Therefore, we submit that the trial court did not 
error in its instructions to the jury with respect to the expert 
testimony offered and even if there v;as errcr, the error was 
certainly not prejudicial to the defendant. In fact, we submit 
that the expert testimony taken, because of tte time elements 
involved, could have ::;ust as easily helped the P.ppellant's case 
as it could have possibly prejudiced it. 
CONCLUSION 
We,. the;refore, submit to this Honorable Court that 
there was sufficient evidence fer the jury to convict the Ap-
pellant of the offense that he was sentenced for ty tte Trial 
court. we also truly conclude th<•t the expert testimony as to 
He breathalyzer results taken in light of tte time period in-
-17-
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valved, was prcperly weighe~ by the jury. The jury was able 
to consider the demeanor of tte parties and the witnesses a~ 
they were properly instructed by the Trial court to ~o;eigh all 
of that evidence in order to render thEir verdict. The court 
properly left the perogative and the decision with the jury 
and, therefore, since the Appellant got a fair trial, this~ 
should not overturn that jury verdict. 
Respectfully subn;itted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
BRUCE M. HALE 
Assistant Attorney Gener2l 
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MAILING CERTIFICl,TE 
Nailed 2 copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-
respondent this 0ay of February, 1978, to Sumner J. 
Hatch, 370 East 500 South, Salt Lake City, Ulah 84111; and 
oonald R. Wilson, 5630 Highland nrive, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84121. 
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